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I. INTRODUCTION
A man lies on his bed, apparently unconscious. Two policemen enter the room.
The officers are responding after the unconscious man’s daughter called 911 to
report he was having a seizure. Logically enough, the officers believe they are
responding to a medical emergency. After all, the dispatcher told them that the man
had suffered a seizure. The police officers, Officers Edgell and Hesnowetz, probably
did not know that their response to this “routine” emergency would entangle them in
a frustrating and costly lawsuit.1 They also did not know that their actions that day
would lead the Sixth Circuit to render yet another bewildering qualified immunity
decision.2
The shibboleth “No man is above the law”3 is an oft-recited maxim of American
legal thought. Today, that maxim plays out in § 19834 lawsuits. These suits give
civil remedies to plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated by public
officials carrying out their official duties. In theory, § 1983 provides citizens with
generous protection against having their constitutional rights violated. Over the last
forty years, however, the Supreme Court carved out a relatively broad common law
qualified immunity defense to shield officials who acted reasonably, but nonetheless
violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.5 Unfortunately, the Court’s qualified
1

McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2010).

2

The Sixth Circuit’s application of the doctrine is inconsistent and at times, seemingly
arbitrary. See, e.g., Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 486 F.3d 217
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that qualified immunity defense was available to defendant
paramedics after the restraint technique they employed as first responders to a seizure victim
led to victim’s death because paramedics responded in a “medical emergency” capacity).
Contra McKenna, 617 F.3d at 434 (holding that police officers responding to a 911 call for a
seizure were not entitled to qualified immunity after they restrained a seizure victim because a
jury decided they acted in a law enforcement capacity). But see Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484
(6th Cir. 2009) (holding that police officers were entitled to qualified immunity after they
hogtied a seizure victim and put him in a jail cell, without applying or mentioning the Peete
medical emergency-law enforcement standard).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so
high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with
impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of
the law, and are bound to obey it. . . . [E]very man who by accepting office participates in its
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.”).
4

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).

5

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-05 (2001) (holding that qualified immunity is
available even when a constitutional violation has occurred if a reasonable official would not
have known that his specific conduct violated the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional
right); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1991) (refining further the objective
reasonableness test for qualified immunity by establishing two-part test: (1) taking the facts in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the trial judge must determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of constitutional rights under current law; and
(2) if a constitutional violation did occur, the judge must then determine whether the
defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time
the violative conduct occurred); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (clarifying
the definition of a violation of a “clearly established” law that would render the defense
inapplicable); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that qualified
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immunity jurisprudence has given the lower federal courts broad license to make
divergent and confusing law when they apply the defense to specific factual
circumstances. Indeed, the doctrine “is in a perpetual state of crisis.”6 Nowhere is
this more readily apparent than in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ inconsistent
qualified immunity decisions. McKenna, the case recounted in the vignette above, is
the latest of these bewildering Sixth Circuit decisions dealing with qualified
immunity’s application to police officers.
The stakes are high. The Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent jurisprudence threatens the
delicate balance that the defense aims to strike between protecting citizens from
having their constitutional rights violated on the one hand and protecting
government officials from undue interference with their official duties on the other.7
This Note critiques the medical emergency-law enforcement response capacity the
Sixth Circuit has set forth to help adjudicate qualified immunity claims and suggests
improvements the court can make to its qualified immunity jurisprudence.
In Part II, I briefly trace the Supreme Court’s development of the doctrine and
outline the doctrine’s policy goals. In Part III, I develop my thesis by exploring the
Sixth Circuit’s recent qualified immunity decisions and showing why the court’s
analytical framework leads to inconsistent results. Then, I argue that the Sixth
Circuit should abandon the artificial medical emergency-law enforcement response
capacity test it uses when police officers respond to medical emergencies. Finally, I
explain why qualified immunity’s policy rationales demand that if the Sixth Circuit
does not abandon the test, it must allow judges to resolve the response capacity issue
as a matter of law.
Lastly, in Part IV, I explore what scholars might say about the Sixth Circuit’s
test. Part IV also answers critics who assert that qualified immunity is a fatally
flawed doctrine. I argue that qualified immunity effectively accomplishes its
fairness and social cost reduction goals.

immunity applies so long as the official’s conduct “does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (holding that qualified immunity applies unless the
officer violated “clearly established” law); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967)
(establishing the common law qualified immunity defense for a police officer who executed
an arrest warrant under a statute later declared unconstitutional, and noting that “police
officer[s] [are] not charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law”).
6

Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1155 (2005).

7

Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
qualified immunity defense is intended to strike a balance between allowing litigants to
recover damages and preventing the “social costs” of such suits from unduly deterring public
officials from dispensing their duties) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE
A. The Defense’s Creation and Evolution in the Supreme Court
The qualified immunity defense is rooted in the common law.8 Specifically, the
Supreme Court first recognized the defense in Pierson v. Ray9. There, the Court
rejected a §1983 claim against a police officer who arrested the plaintiff under a
statute later declared unconstitutional.10 The defense first recognized in Pierson
eventually became today’s qualified immunity defense. Public officials use the
defense to defeat § 1983 lawsuits at the summary judgment stage. After Pierson, the
Court modified the defense several times.11 A lengthy exposition of the policies
behind each of these modifications is outside the scope of this Note.12 Here, it
suffices to note that the recent Supreme Court decisions apply an objective test to
both the officer’s conduct and the underlying legality of the conduct to determine
whether the defense should apply.13 A brief explanation of that objective test’s
evolution frames the problem with the Sixth Circuit’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence.
1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald: “Objectifying” the Defense
Harlow v. Fitzgerald14 is the lynchpin of the modern, objective reasonableness
test that determines if qualified immunity applies in a given situation. The Court
departed from earlier decisions, such as Wood v. Strickland,15 which held that there
was both a subjective and objective component to the defense and based its
applicability on a “good faith” standard. In Wood, the defense would not apply if the
officer “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took . . . would
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]”16 (the objective component) or if
“[the officer] took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
8

Thomas E. O’Brien, The Paradox of Qualified Immunity: How a Mechanical
Application of the Objective Legal Reasonableness Test Can Undermine the Goal of Qualified
Immunity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 767, 767 (2004) (“Qualified immunity is a judicially created
doctrine. . . .”).
9

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

10

Id. at 555 (holding that a police officer will not be liable for a false arrest when the
arrest is made under a statute the officer reasonably believed to be valid).
11

See supra note 5 for a quick, but exhaustive list of Supreme Court precedent here.

12

See Saiman, supra note 6, at 1155-1168 for an excellent, in-depth discussion of the
Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence; see also Michael Avery, Unreasonable
Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of Circumstances Relevant to
Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 261 (2003).
13

See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that the defense is available if a
reasonable official would not have known that his specific conduct violated the plaintiff’s
“clearly established” constitutional right).
14

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

15

Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).

16

Id. at 322.
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constitutional rights or other injury”17 (the subjective component). In short, under
Wood, a court could hold the defense inapplicable even if the officer’s conduct was
objectively reasonable if the court found that the officer intended to deprive the
plaintiff of her constitutional rights.
Harlow abolished Wood’s subjective component and adopted a wholly objective
test to determine whether the defense applied. In Harlow, the plaintiff alleged that
former senior aides to President Nixon violated his constitutional rights by
conspiring to wrongfully discharge him.18 The Court held that “government officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”19 The
Court’s holding assumed that an objective test, which eliminated any need for the
purely factual inquiry into the officer’s subjective intent, would permit the resolution
of many claims via summary judgment. Resolving constitutional tort claims early
by applying a purely objective test to official conduct would theoretically shield
government officials and society from the potentially crippling social costs of
excessive litigation.20 In sum, the Court noted, “[subjective] [i]nquiries of this kind
can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.”21 Harlow gave birth to the
purely objective qualified immunity inquiry.
2. Siegert v. Gilley: Refining Harlow’s Objective Test
Siegert v. Gilley22 clarified Harlow’s general objective test into a two-prong
inquiry that is now the standard for assessing whether qualified immunity applies in
a given situation. Siegert sued his former employer, a federal hospital. He alleged
that his former supervisor defamed him when the supervisor responded to Siegert’s
prospective employer’s reference request by saying that he could not recommend
Siegert because he was “inept and unethical, perhaps the least trustworthy individual
I have supervised. . . .”23 The supervisor asserted qualified immunity under Harlow
and argued that he did not violate any “clearly established right” as required under

17

Id.

18

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. More specifically, the Harlow plaintiff alleged that the
conspiracy to wrongfully discharge him was part of the infamous larger Watergate conspiracy
that defines the Nixon presidency. For a detailed factual account of the larger conspiracy, see
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
19

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added).

20

Id. at 816-17 (“Not only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of
trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary
action, and deterrence of able people from public service. There are special costs to
‘subjective’ inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is available only to officials
performing discretionary functions. . . . Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore
may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an
official’s professional colleagues.”).
21

Id. at 817.

22

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991).

23

Id. at 228.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011

5

470

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:465

Harlow’s objective test.24 The District Court denied the defense, but the appeals
court and the Supreme Court both held that the supervisor was entitled to summary
judgment under the objective qualified immunity test.
In Siegert, the Court crafted a two-prong test to determine whether qualified
immunity applies. The Court held that the applicability of qualified immunity
necessarily involved two questions. First, the court must take the facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and determine if the plaintiff has alleged the violation
of a clearly established constitutional right under current law.25 Second, if the
plaintiff has indeed asserted such a violation, a court must apply Harlow to
determine whether a reasonable official acting under the circumstances and in light
of current law would have found the conduct in question to be reasonable.26 If the
answer to either question is “no,” then qualified immunity applies. Here too, the
Court crafted its holding with a social costs rationale in mind, as it noted that
expediently resolving meritless suits via summary judgment would spare
government officials from the social costs of litigation.27 That much, at least, was
nothing revolutionary for qualified immunity. The Court’s refined test, however,
created a new issue it would soon resolve: What is a “clearly established” law? A
decade passed before the Court definitively answered that question in Saucier v.
Katz.
3. Saucier v. Katz: Expanding the Defense vis-à-vis the Clearly Established Law
Standard
In Saucier v. Katz,28 the Court added yet another wrinkle to the qualified
immunity analysis. Siegert’s first prong mandated that the plaintiff allege that the
official violated a “clearly established law.” In Saucier, a military officer shoved
Saucier, who was protesting at an Al Gore speech, into a van because he had a
threatening banner. The plaintiff sued the officer, and the officer asserted qualified
immunity. Saucier clarified two issues that had plagued lower courts after Siegert.
First, the lower courts were uncertain of how to analyze if a law had been
“clearly established”: Did it fold into the general inquiry of whether the official
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or was it a separate issue? The Court
answered the latter. It held that courts must first determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged a constitutional violation before even considering whether the particular
conduct violated clearly established law.29 The plaintiff’s baldly alleging a
24

Id. at 229.

25

Id. at 232 (“A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional
right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the
determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”).
26

Id.

27

Id. (“Decision of this purely legal question permits courts expeditiously to weed out
suits which fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity
to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits. One
of the purposes of [qualified] immunity . . . is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted
liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn
out lawsuit.”).
28

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).

29

Id. at 201.
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constitutional violation would not suffice to defeat summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. In order to defeat summary judgment under Siegert, the
plaintiff also had to show that the officer violated “clearly established law,” which
had been a point of significant confusion in the lower courts.
Second, the Court clarified just how a “law” becomes “clearly established.”
Before Saucier, many courts folded the issue into the general constitutional inquiry,
which by nature is a fact-based inquiry. For instance, in analyzing an excessive
force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a court considers, among other things,
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.”30 Saucier held that courts should not equate an
affirmative finding of a constitutional violation under the circumstances with a
finding that the law was clearly established. To the contrary, a law will only be
“clearly established” if there is pre-existing case law clearly announcing that the
official’s specific conduct was illegal.31 The Court noted that the governing standard
is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.”32 The Court then went on to demonstrate how a
“reasonable officer” could determine that the conduct he was about to engage in was
in fact unlawful:
It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal
doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An
officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a
mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal
in those circumstances. If the officer’s mistake as to what the law
requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the [qualified]
immunity defense.33
In short, the Court clearly held that a law is only “clearly established” for
purposes of defeating the defense if there is clearly analogous case law or a statute
forbidding the officer’s precise, fact-specific conduct.34 The thrust of Saucier is a bit
paradoxical, as an officer can be found to have acted unreasonably vis-à-vis the
appropriate constitutional standard but still held to have acted reasonably in applying
the relevant legal standard, or lack thereof, to the situation if there is no directly
analogous case law on point.35 Qualified immunity applies unless the officer had
30

Id. at 205 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

31

Id. (“The qualified immunity inquiry, on the other hand, has a further dimension. The
concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to
the legal constraints on particular police conduct.”).
32

Id. at 202.

33

Id. at 205.

34

Id.

35

Commentators criticized Saucier for establishing a seemingly illogical standard of
“reasonable unreasonableness.” See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Saucier v. Katz: Qualified
Immunity as a Doctrine of Dilution of Constitutional Rights, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK
TO THE REHNQUIST COURT: EIGHT CASES THAT SUBVERTED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS
172-187 (Michael Avery ed., 2009). For an excellent argument that the Saucier standard is
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clear notice through prior, directly analogous case law that his conduct violated the
plaintiff’s rights. In the end, Saucier, like the other landmark qualified immunity
decisions that came before it, has confused the lower courts. This Note discusses
how the Sixth Circuit’s application of the clearly established law standard is
inconsistent, leads to arbitrary outcomes, and undermines the goals of qualified
immunity.36
B. A Delicate Balancing Act: The Defense’s Rationales
A brief description of qualified immunity’s policy goals helps frame the issues
with the Sixth Circuit’s qualified immunity jurisprudence. In theory, the defense
aims to do four things. First, the word “qualified” in the defense means it is not an
absolute bar to government official liability. The defense’s limited nature ensures
that plaintiffs will have the right to legal remedies in order to vindicate unreasonable
violations of their constitutional rights.37 Second, the defense ensures that public
officials will not be held liable for every single constitutional violation.38 Third, the
defense encourages public officials to discharge their duties with zeal by quelling the
fear that every action they take is a potential ticket to the “litigation lottery.”39
Finally, the defense allows courts to dispose of many suits at the summary judgment
stage, which substantially reduces the social costs of litigation on public officials.40
This last rationale posits that constitutional tort claims should be resolved quickly
wherever possible in order to permit the official to resume his socially valuable
official duties.41 The Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent application of the defense
undermines each of these policies.42
II. DISCUSSION
A. Examples of the Sixth Circuit’s Inconsistent Qualified Immunity Jurisprudence
McKenna v. Edgell,43 the case from the introductory vignette,44 is just the latest in
a long line of conflicting Sixth Circuit qualified immunity jurisprudence. The Sixth
Circuit is not the only federal court to struggle with the doctrine. Indeed, the
not in fact paradoxical, see Michael M. Rosen, Comment, A Qualified Defense: In Support of
the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, with Some Suggestions for its
Improvement, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 139, 151-56 (2005).
36

See infra Part III.

37

O’Brien, supra note 8, at 768.

38

Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of
Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
39

Id. at 3-4.

40

Id. at 4.

41

See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (noting that courts should resolve
the issue of qualified immunity expediently).
42

See infra Part III.B.

43

McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2010).

44

See supra Part I.
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defense’s “application and administration continue to perplex courts.”45 The Sixth
Circuit is unique, however, in its wholesale attempts to add analytical steps to the
doctrine. These attempts simply muddy the waters and prevent qualified immunity
from serving its explicit policy goals. Particularly, the Sixth Circuit exacerbates the
problem further when it does not consistently apply its own innovations to the cases
it decides. If the Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent approach to qualified immunity
continues, basic notions of justice and fairness inherent in the doctrine will fall by
the wayside. Examples of the Sixth Circuit’s inconsistency in action frame the
problem.
1. Peete v. Nashville: The Medical Emergency-Law Enforcement “Test”
In Peete v. Nashville,46 the decedent’s grandmother called 911 to report that her
grandson was experiencing an epileptic seizure.47 The defendants, an assorted group
of firefighters, paramedics, and emergency medical technicians, arrived at the scene
and briefly discussed the decedent’s history of epilepsy with the grandmother.48 The
defendants then approached the decedent, restrained him, and used their bodies to
apply pressure to his neck and head, pinning the decedent in a prone position.49
Despite their medical training, the defendants did not take any measures to ensure
that the decedent had a clear airway.50 Within minutes, the decedent died.51 The
District Court denied the defendants’ qualified immunity motion.52 The court held
that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because “the rights at
issue ‘are clearly established.’”53
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and granted qualified
immunity based on a problematic bifurcated standard that cannot be found in other
courts’ qualified immunity jurisprudence.54 The court held that qualified immunity
would be more readily available if a given defendant responded in a medical
emergency capacity, rather than a law enforcement capacity.55 The Court addressed
the “clearly established” law standard, noting that “there are no cases applying the
Fourth Amendment to paramedics coming to the aid of an unconscious individual as
45

Chen, supra note 38, at 4.

46

Peete v. Nashville, 486 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2007).

47

Id. at 219-220.

48

Id. at 220.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id. The plaintiff also alleged two other claims: (1) failing to provide medical attention;
and (2) failing to protect the decedent from other emergency actions.
53

Id.

54

Id. at 223. The standard seems sensible enough, and indeed can lead to desirable
outcomes. The problem comes when the standard is arbitrarily applied based on a mere job
title or when the court completely defers to a jury’s finding on what capacity the officer
responded in. See the discussion of McKenna v. Edgell, infra Part III.A.2.
55

Peete, 486 F.3d at 219.
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a result of a 911 call by a family member.”56 More specifically, the court reversed
the trial court’s holding that the defendants violated “clearly established law”:
“[W]here the purpose is to render solicited aid in an emergency rather than to
enforce the law . . . there is no federal case authority creating a constitutional
liability for the [conduct] alleged in the instant case.”57 Finally, the court reasoned
that qualified immunity applied because the defendants did not seize the decedent to
interfere with his liberty or to enforce the law; rather, they were responding to his
request for medical assistance.58 Here, even though the paramedics “badly botched
the job,” qualified immunity attached because they were assisting the decedent.59
Peete should have “clearly established” that a state actor giving medical care was
entitled to qualified immunity. But, McKenna shows that it established no such
coherent principle.
2. McKenna v. Edgell:60 the Peete Test and the Danger of Overdeferring to the Jury
In McKenna, the Sixth Circuit denied the defendant police officers the defense
based on facts strikingly similar to Peete. The defendant-officers arrived at the
plaintiff’s home after the plaintiff’s daughter called 911 to report that her father was
suffering a seizure.61 The daughter directed the officers to the man’s bedroom,
where they found him lying in bed.62 From there, the factual accounts departed. The
daughter testified that the officers asked her if the plaintiff used drugs. According to
her, the officers became frustrated when McKenna protested their requests for him to
get out of bed; they then handcuffed his wrists and ankles.63 On the other hand, the
officers testified that McKenna was comatose when they arrived. The officers
testified that they roused McKenna by “placing a hand on his shoulder.”64 In
response, McKenna became enraged and shoved the officers so hard that one of
them fell down.65 By the officers’ account, they handcuffed him to protect

56

Id. at 220.

57

Id. at 221 (emphasis added).

58
Id. at 222 (“They are unlike the police officers in Champion who handcuffed and
shackled the plaintiff in order to arrest and incapacitate him. The cases are not the same
because the paramedics acted in order [to] provide medical aid to Becerra [the decedent].”).
59
Id. (“They were attempting to help him, although they badly botched the job according
to the complaint. Since Becerra was neither communicative, nor conscious and the
paramedics were attempting to render aid, neither Green nor Champion applies.”).
60

McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2010).

61

Id. at 435.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 435-36. It is worth noting that the daughter admitted that she was talking to one
of the officer’s at the start of the incident and “‘couldn’t see exactly what was going on’ for
some period.” Id. at 435. The majority downplayed this admission, which could have been
crucial if they elected to review de novo the jury’s finding as to the officers’ response
capacity. See infra Part III.B.2.
64

Id. at 435.

65

Id. at 435-36.
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themselves and McKenna.66 Then, the officers searched McKenna’s dresser drawer
and medicine cabinet for possible legal or illegal drugs that had caused his
condition.67 McKenna himself testified he had “no recollection” of his behavior
during the seizure.68
The Sixth Circuit applied the Peete medical emergency-law enforcement
standard to deny the officers the qualified immunity defense. It completely deferred
to the trial jury’s finding that the officers acted in a law enforcement capacity even
though 911 dispatched the officers to assist with a seizure, a medical condition.69
The officers temporarily restrained McKenna, just as the Peete defendants did;
however, unlike the Peete defendants, they did not pin him or use other similar
physical force to physically harm him. So, in a sense, the consequences of the
officers’ actions here did not lead to the severe physical consequences seen in Peete.
Yet, the jury concluded that the officers acted in a law enforcement capacity because
they executed a limited search of McKenna’s top dresser drawer and medicine
cabinet and ran his license plates because the officers “believed [they] might be
dealing with an intoxicated person . . . or a person having a diabetic reaction.”70
These limited actions, which presumably could be justified as reasonable by a
medical professional responding to the same scene, sufficed to convince the Sixth
Circuit that the jury acted within its proper discretion. The patently unfair result here
is all the more jarring in light of the court’s other recent qualified immunity
decisions. I will now discuss how the Sixth Circuit can ameliorate some of this
unfairness and inconsistency.
B. What the Sixth Circuit Can Do to Craft a More Consistent Qualified Immunity
Doctrine
McKenna, Peete, and other cases discussed in the following section show that the
Sixth Circuit’s attempts to add nuance to qualified immunity’s open-ended
reasonableness standard leads to more problems than solutions. This part of the
Note first shows why the Sixth Circuit should abandon the Peete medical
emergency-law enforcement test and faithfully adhere to Harlow and its progeny. It
then goes on to establish why strong policy reasons require the Sixth Circuit to take
the medical emergency-law enforcement inquiry from the jury if it continues to use
the test.
1. The Court Must Discard the Medical-Law Enforcement Dichotomy and Refrain
from Making Further “Innovations” to the Doctrine
The Sixth Circuit’s attempt to clarify the open-ended reasonableness inquiry
through the medical emergency-law enforcement test flies in the face of Supreme
66

Id. at 436.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 444. Although the Sixth Circuit does not explicitly note that it is deferring to the
jury, its wholesale deferral is implicit in its McKenna reasoning. It notes, “[h]ere, as in
Champion, ‘we are acutely aware that a jury, faced directly with the tasks we cannot
undertake, believed the evidence presented by the Plaintiff.’” Id. at 437-38.
70

Id. at 436.
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Court precedent.71 The divergent results in McKenna and Peete testify to the
problem with the test: It leads to unfair and arbitrary results that turn on the
defendant’s job title rather than the actual purpose of the defendant’s conduct. A
closer look shows that Peete’s medical emergency-law enforcement test does not
hold up to legal scrutiny.
First, more unfair and arbitrary outcomes will result if the court continues to
apply the standard. Compare the result in Peete with the result in McKenna. In
Peete, paramedics received qualified immunity after they restrained a seizure victim
and applied pressure to his back, causing him to die.72 Here, the court established
the medical emergency-law enforcement test, “where the purpose is to render . . . aid
in an emergency rather than to enforce the law . . . there is no federal case authority
creating a constitutional liability for the negligence, deliberate indifference, and
incompetence alleged in the instant case.”73 After Peete, a reasonable public official
should have been able to conclude that qualified immunity attached if she acted to
“render . . . aid in an emergency.”74
The court proved otherwise in McKenna. Here, police officers who responded to
a scenario strikingly similar to Peete were denied qualified immunity based on the
Peete test. The officers were bewilderingly held to have acted in a law enforcement
capacity despite their using a less severe restraint method (i.e., they did not pin the
plaintiff as in Peete). More crucially, the plaintiff did not die like the Peete plaintiff
did. The result seems extraordinarily unfair in light of other Sixth Circuit cases, like
Everson v. Leis,75 where the defense immunized officers who hogtied a seizure
victim and took him to a jail cell.76 Given the “fact-sensitive”77 nature of qualified
immunity, the standard is likely to lead to more unfair results like McKenna.
Skeptics might argue that these fairness concerns are overstated because in many
situations, “safety nets” like a union legal defense fund or an insurance policy will
protect officers’ personal assets from a costly judgment.78 At a basic economic level,
71
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that qualified immunity is an inquiry into the
reasonableness of conduct, not an inquiry into the purposes of the conduct. See cases cited
supra note 5.
72

Peete v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 486 F.3d 217, 219-20 (6th Cir.
2007).
73

Id. at 221.

74

Id.

75

Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2009).

76

Id. at 488-89. The Court decided Everson two years after Peete, but it curiously did not
mention the medical emergency-law enforcement capacity standard, despite the officers’
responding to a 911 call for a seizure. Furthermore, in every imaginable instance, “hogtying”
a victim and taking him to the police station constitute more severe restrictions on the
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights than temporarily restraining him at his home until
medical help arrives. The officers’ actions encompass the very definition of “law
enforcement” under the standard: they acted “to incarcerate,” however briefly the
incarceration actually lasted.
77

See Saiman, supra note 6, at 1184 (“the standard must be calibrated to the specific facts
of the case”).
78

On this point, see Rosen, supra note 35, at 147-48.
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this argument sounds rational enough. But, it fails to account for the “secondary
social costs” that any litigation, regardless of outcome, will impose on an officer.79
An officer forced to endure a lengthy trial on a matter within a judge’s province
could face higher insurance premiums, reputational damage, and job discipline, such
as unpaid leave pending conclusion of the litigation.80 In sum, the fairness concerns
extend beyond the “bottom line” issue of monetary liability, and indemnification
gives the officer precious little comfort during the stressful litigation process itself.
In fact, these additional fairness concerns likely spurred the Supreme Court to
espouse the social costs rationale as the primary policy behind qualified immunity.81
Second, the Sixth Circuit created the test without any support in the case law.
Neither the Peete standard nor anything like it can be found in the other circuits or
the Supreme Court. To the contrary, the Supreme Court molded this common law
doctrine to turn on objective reasonableness in light of all the relevant facts.82 It did
not intend the inquiry to turn on one fact, such as the officer’s response capacity. In
Peete, the court made a leap that defied logic. Somehow, the court reasoned that
since there was no “clearly established law” governing paramedics’ conduct, it had
the authority to craft a standard that does not exist in other courts’ qualified
immunity law.83 The Sixth Circuit overstepped its authority in creating this
“artificial distinction”84 and its qualified immunity law now conflicts with Supreme
Court case law.
That conflict arises because the Peete test conflicts with Saucier’s “clearly
established law” standard. Under Saucier, a law would only be “clearly established”
(and qualified immunity would be denied) if “clearly analogous” case law announces
that the officer’s conduct is illegal.85 Saucier reaffirms that qualified immunity
inquiries must be fact-specific.86 Moreover, the inquiries must take all the relevant
facts into account.87 The medical emergency-law enforcement capacity standard
incorrectly shifts the focus from all the facts to a single, often murky fact: In what
capacity did the officer respond? This improper focus places officers in an
insurmountable Catch-22.

79

Id. at 148.

80

Id.

81

Chen, supra note 38, at 4.

82

For a quick survey of the relevant Supreme Court qualified immunity case law, see
supra Part II.A. For a more detailed summary of the doctrine’s history, see Saiman, supra
note 6.
83

Orin Kerr, McKenna v. Edgell and Civil Liability for Police Officers Responding to 911
Calls for Assistance, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 18, 2010, 11:45 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/08/18/mckenna-v-edgell-and-civil-liability-for-fourth-amendmentviolations/ (“There are no artificial categories like ‘Peete protection’ that get triggered as a
matter of stare decisis based on dicta from a qualified immunity ruling in an earlier case.”).
84

Id.

85

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

86

Kerr, supra note 83.

87

Id.
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This Catch-22 prevents police officers responding to medical emergencies from
knowing what capacity they are acting in as a matter of law. Consider the following
twist on McKenna. Assume the officers respond to a 911 call for a seizure victim,
the victim’s daughter lets them in, and they find a man unconscious on the bed. The
officers handcuff the man after they rouse him awake, and he shoves them. This
time, however, the man’s daughter tells the officers that her father is diabetic and
that seizures tend to make him aggressive. She tells them her father needs insulin
and that he keeps it somewhere in his room, but she is unsure if it is in his dresser or
medicine cabinet. The officers then search both after restraining him, just as the
officers in McKenna did, and find nothing. What result will a jury reach under the
medical emergency-law enforcement test? Under McKenna, a reasonable jury could
reach either conclusion. Undoubtedly, police officers frequently encounter similar
scenarios. The unpredictable nature of the test suggests that any law established
under the test will be far from clear to police officers who must make split-second
decisions.
That unpredictability is largely due to the Sixth Circuit’s failing to define the
Peete test in any legally significant way. For police officers who wish to discern just
what law Peete and McKenna have “clearly established,” McKenna’s discussion of
the Peete standard is circular at best. McKenna claims that Peete does not make
liability contingent on the official’s profession.88 But, it does not tell us what Peete
actually stands for. Instead, the court equivocates, “Peete may stand for the
proposition that when a government agent acting in the role of a paramedic—any
medical-emergency responders—commits an unreasonable search or seizure, it is not
yet clearly established that the conduct violates the Fourth Amendment.”89 The court
then concludes, “[T]he police officers here were not necessarily offering medical
assistance. Although [they] were first on the scene . . . it is not clear that trying to
get someone out of bed and get him dressed constitutes medical assistance.”90 The
court leaves a trained lawyer (or police officer) to ponder just what conduct might
“clearly” constitute medical assistance. Neither Peete nor McKenna give a coherent
legal test that either judges or juries can apply to determine whether the official acted
in a medical or law enforcement capacity.91
Without a coherent legal standard, police officers making split-second decisions
in a medical response context will be left with precious little assurance that they will
not be held liable in certain situations. In theory, qualified immunity ensures that
88
McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 438-439 (6th Cir. 2010) (“As a general matter,
exposure to liability does not depend merely on the profession of the government actors.”).
89

Id. at 439.

90

Id.

91
On this point, see Kerr, supra note 83. Also, it is difficult to say what kind of test the
court could possibly come up with, given the variety of situations police officers encounter.
But one can imagine some type of multi-factor test styled after other torts, with no single
factor being dispositive. Sample factors might include how the officer arrived at the scene,
the extent to which reasonable officers would believe they are responding to a medical
emergency in a similar situation, the extent of the officer’s professional training in dealing
with a materially similar medical issue, the extent to which a reasonable officer would realize
the conduct at issue may implicate constitutional rights, and the like. To be sure, some type of
substantive standard would be superior to the Sixth Circuit’s standard, which announces no
test at all.
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public officials can vigorously discharge their duties without fear of being civilly
liable for reasonable errors in judgment.92 Here, the lack of a defined standard
means that police officers responding to medical emergencies may hedge their bets
and do the “bare minimum” in order to avoid a jury finding that they acted to enforce
the law. The Supreme Court did not intend this result when it framed the doctrine to
encourage public officials to vigorously discharge their duties.93
Worse yet, the test also leaves trained legal minds to question when the test,
however undefined it is, will apply at all. Everson v. Leis94 was decided between
Peete and McKenna, but Everson did not apply the standard despite similar facts.
Recall that in Everson police officers hogtied the epileptic plaintiff and took him into
custody after he allegedly kicked and swung at them. Here, the Sixth Circuit gave
the officers qualified immunity.95 Yet, the court made no mention of the year-old
Peete test. Since the officers not only hogtied the man, but also jailed him, a Peete
inquiry seemed appropriate. Under Peete, the officers’ claim to qualified immunity
should have been subject to stricter scrutiny under the law enforcement prong since
they jailed the plaintiff. Here, the court cryptically rebuts the plaintiff’s reliance on
Peete without mentioning or applying the test.96 Instead, the court held that an Ohio
statute codifying a standard of care for police officers responding to a medical
emergency97 did not “clearly establish” that the officers’ conduct was forbidden.98
One ponders how the Sixth Circuit expects its case law to guide officers in such
situations if it does not consistently apply the test when the conduct treads the line
between law enforcement and medical response, as it did in both McKenna and
Everson.
This inconsistent application of the test to medical situations similarly
undermines the officer’s ability to respond using his best, but rudimentary medical
judgment and training. Professor Orin Kerr characterizes the standard as one
implicating puzzling “constitutional metaphysics.”99 Indeed, it seems that this test
92

See Chen, supra note 38, at 14; see also supra Part II.B.

93

See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (“Denying any measure of
immunity in these circumstances ‘would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.’”).
94

Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2009).

95

Id. at 500.

96

Id. at 499 (“Contrary to Everson’s argument on appeal, law enforcement officials are
not necessarily precluded under federal law from arresting someone who displays symptoms
of a known medical condition. . . . The cases from this circuit that Everson relies upon,
Champion and Peete, are inapposite. . . . As for Peete, the court found that paramedics did not
violate the right of the epileptic plaintiff to be free of unreasonable seizure by the
government.”).
97

OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.43(A) (2010) provides:

A law enforcement officer shall make a diligent effort to determine whether any
disabled person he finds is an epileptic or a diabetic, or suffers from some other type
of illness that would cause the condition. Whenever feasible, this effort shall be made
before the person is charged with a crime or taken to a place of detention.
98

Everson, 556 F.3d at 500.

99

Kerr, supra note 83.
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creates more problems than it solves. For instance, when does the standard apply?
The Peete, Everson, and McKenna trio leave that question unanswered. Also, what
is the governing legal standard that decides whether the officer acted in a law
enforcement or medical response capacity? Again, the Sixth Circuit gives us no
Hand formula or any remotely qualitative legal standard to evaluate the conduct.
The test merely announces a nominal dichotomy between medical and law
enforcement capacity. This test gives officers little guidance in evaluating their own
conduct. It leaves complicated issues to wallow in the ether.
The court’s inability to announce a coherent legal test and its failure to apply the
nebulous standard consistently show why it is so important to follow the Supreme
Court’s general, but fact-intensive qualified immunity inquiry.100 Qualified
immunity’s fact-sensitive nature does not render it amenable to artificial distinctions
like the Sixth Circuit’s medical emergency-law enforcement test. The court should
discard the test and return to analyzing qualified immunity on an objective
reasonableness standard under Harlow and Saucier. But, until it chooses to do so,
the court’s analytical framework under the Peete test needs serious work.
2. If the Sixth Circuit Retains the Standard, the Officer’s Response Capacity Should
be a Question of Law for the Court
Qualified immunity primarily aims to resolve frivolous claims against public
officials at summary judgment in order to prevent burdensome excessive social costs
to both the officials and society.101 So, qualified immunity is a question of law that a
judge typically resolves before trial.102 But, in cases like McKenna, where the
outcome turns on disputed factual testimony, the Supreme Court’s qualified
immunity framework requires taking the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and summary judgment is precluded.103 In these situations, the jury
ultimately determines qualified immunity. Here, the qualified immunity issue
becomes a mixed question of law and fact.104 Mixed questions of law and fact are
100

See supra Part IV.

101

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (“At the same time, however, it cannot
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a
cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole. These social costs include
the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing social issues, and the
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.”).
102

Chen, supra note 38, at 4; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“On summary judgment, the judge
appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was
clearly established at the time an action occurred.”).
103
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court
required to rule upon qualified immunity must consider . . . this threshold question: Taken in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”).
104

Professor Alan Chen does an excellent job describing the “continuum” that exists
between questions of law and questions of fact:
Rather than following a strict dichotomy, a continuum exists between “pure”
questions of law at one extreme and questions of “historical” fact at the other. Courts
can resolve pure questions of law by the application of legal principles to a set of
undisputed facts. For example, issues involving the meaning of a particular word in a
statute or the Constitution are legal issues. If no disputed facts exist, the assessment
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best thought of as lying on a continuum, with some questions lying closer to the
legal side of the continuum and others lying closer to the factual side of the
continuum.105
In his seminal work on facts and summary judgment, Judge William Schwarzer
attempts to guide courts along that continuum. He identifies a particular type of
mixed question of law and fact called the “ultimate fact.”106 “Ultimate facts” require
the resolution of certain historical facts, but have a “decidedly more law-like aspect
to them.”107 Ultimate facts are “derived by reasoning or inference from evidence,
but, like issues of law, they incorporate legal principles . . . that give them
independent legal significance. . . . Ultimate facts can be more ‘factual’ (e.g.,
whether a driver . . . negligently operated an automobile), or more ‘legal’ (e.g.,
whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure for First Amendment purposes).”108
Ultimate facts may lie on either side of the continuum (i.e., more factual or more
legal).109
The determination of what side of that continuum a particular ultimate fact lies
on is important because it serves a “functional purpose.”110 That is, if the proper
answer mandates “‘an assessment of human behavior and expectations within the
common experience’ of the average person,”111 then the ultimate fact is on the
continuum’s factual side, and the jury should resolve it. On the other hand, if the
ultimate fact question “relate[s] to matters of law and policy and disputes involving
technical issues,”112 then the judge should resolve it as a matter of law because
“‘[t]he administration of the rules under which they arise benefits from consistency,
uniformity, and predictability.’”113 In sum, trained judges, not juries, should resolve
those ultimate facts that are more legal in nature to promote consistent outcomes in
similar cases.114
The ultimate fact under the medical emergency-law enforcement standard, the
determination of what capacity the officer responded in, lies on the legal side of the
of whether a necessary element of a claim or defense has been met is a purely legal
one. In contrast, a “historical” fact is a “thing done, an action performed, or an event
or occurrence,” such as a trigger pulled, a fist swung, or a word spoken. The trier of
fact has the responsibility of resolving disputes over historical facts, or concerning
reasonable inferences to be drawn from such facts.
Chen, supra note 38, at 88.
105

See id.

106

Id. at 89.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 89 (citing William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary
Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 456-57 (1992)).
109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.
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continuum and should be resolved by a judge. The Sixth Circuit rejected this
approach in McKenna by deferring to the jury’s verdict on appeal.115 The court drew
a facially appealing analogy to negligence law and asserted, “juries are often asked
to go beyond the finding of historical facts and to make objective
characterizations.”116 It acknowledged that leaving the issue to the jury would lead
to varied results, but noted that this result did not differ from other objective
characterizations left to the jury (e.g., negligence).117 The majority then cautioned
that it retained the authority to make a determination as a matter of law when “a
reasonable jury could come to but one conclusion.”118
This deference to the jury on the ultimate fact determination of response capacity
fails to uphold three of qualified immunity’s explicit policy goals.
First, under qualified immunity, basic notions of fairness mandate that public
officials should not be held personally liable for every constitutional violation.119
Members of the general public, who ultimately comprise the jury, tend to stigmatize
police officers as untrustworthy, inept, or corrupt.120 The Peete standard is in its
infancy, and any empirical data reflecting how juries will find on the medical-law
enforcement question is lacking. So the argument here is purely hypothetical. The
argument, however, is rooted in our common experience. If the court leaves the
medical response-law enforcement issue to the jury, juries (composed of common
people who tend to distrust law enforcement and authority) are more likely than not
to view police officers acting in “gray area” factual circumstances like McKenna
with the suspicion of law enforcement. This hypothetical scenario will potentially
expose police officers to unfair liability in situations where a court could hold that as
a matter of law, the police officer acted in a medical emergency capacity.
115

McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 442-43 (2010) (“Were we to determine this issue, we
would simply be substituting our judgment about the overall character of a set of facts for that
of the jury.”).
116

Id. at 442.

117

Id. at 443.

118

Id.

119

Chen, supra note 38, at 2. See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975)
(“Liability for damages for every action which is found subsequently to have been violative of
. . . constitutional rights . . . would unfairly impose upon [the official] the burden of mistakes
made in good faith in the course of exercising his discretion within the scope of his official
duties.”).
120

See, e.g., Mary Pieper, Some Crime Victims Fear Retaliation, Distrust Police, GLOBE
GAZETTE
(Mason
City,
Iowa),
May
27,
2010,
http://www.globegazette.com/news/local/article_3abeda64-69e6-11df-8582001cc4c002e0.html; 1 Year Later: Less Crime, More Mistrust, AUSTIN NEWS, May 12, 2010,
available at
http://www.kxan.com/dpp/news/kxan-1-yr-after-officer-involved-nathanielsanders-shooting; Anne Michaud, NY Cops Biased, Crain’s Poll Finds Minorities Treated
Differently; Overall, City Supports NYPD, CRAIN’S NEW YORK BUSINESS, Apr. 8, 2007,
available at http://www.charneyresearch.com/2007Apr8_Crains_NYCopsBiased.htm (noting
that 45% of New Yorkers believe police are too aggressive); see also Rosen, supra note 35, at
140 (noting that police officers labor under a “growing movement” of “depolicing,” where
government decreases its support for police officers as a result of growing popular discontent
towards police departments and their personnel”).
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Second, that potential unfair exposure to liability could cause police officers to
“pull their punches” and refrain from performing their duties with zeal.121 Qualified
immunity aims to avoid precisely this result. If an officer responding to a medical
call knows that any potential treatment or action could lead to a jury finding he acted
in a law enforcement capacity, he may elect to simply do the bare minimum until
trained medical personnel arrive. Picture Officers Edgell and Hesnowetz arriving in
McKenna’s bedroom to find him unconscious or incapacitated. If the officers knew
then what they know now, that a jury will make the complex determination of their
response capacity, perhaps they will think it more prudent to secure the scene and
wait for properly trained medical personnel. Instead of trying to rouse the patient,
which can lead to aggression, the officers may avoid creating any trouble for
themselves. Perhaps because of this caution, the officers neglect to perform basic
CPR, and Mr. McKenna’s airway becomes blocked. As a result, he dies. Qualified
immunity discourages this type of fatal inertia. It intends to ensure that the public is
amply protected by officials who can zealously perform their duties without fear of
reprisal for reasonable mistakes. Officials will be far more likely to act in these
“gray areas” if they know their fate is in the hands of a legally trained judge who is
well versed in the policies underlying the law.
Third, and most crucially, leaving the determination of the “ultimate fact” of
response capacity to the jury undermines the dominant contemporary justification for
qualified immunity, which is to reduce the social costs of litigation against public
officials by allowing judges to dispose of suits at the summary judgment stage.122
Put simply, compelling reasons support giving a judge the power to rule as a matter
of law on the officer’s response capacity. These compelling reasons square with
general principles of tort law and common sense.
Lawsuits against public officials for deprivations of constitutional rights sound in
tort law. Although tort law often leaves dispositive issues to the jury (e.g., whether a
defendant was negligent),123 tort law leaves some issues to the court. The
determination of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous for the purposes of
strict tort liability, for instance, is a question of law for the judge to decide.124 That
determination is left to the court because it is “no part of the province of the jury to
decide whether an industrial enterprise upon which the community’s prosperity
might depend [is abnormally dangerous].”125 In other words, the judge makes the
121

The National Association of Police Organizations asserts that the threat of a trial
negatively impacts officers’ conduct in a grave manner. Rosen, supra note 35, at 145 (citing
Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Police Organizations & National Law Enforcement
Officers’ Rights Center, in Support of the Petitioner at 2, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)
(No. 99-1977)).
122

Indeed, the Supreme Court has made the social cost reduction rationale the primary
policy justification for qualified immunity. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200 (“Where the
defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the
proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is
dispositive.”); see also Chen, supra note 38, at 4.
123
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. l (1977) (“Whether the . . .
defendant . . . has been negligent is ordinarily an issue to be left to the jury.”).
124
Id. (“Whether the activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by the
court. . . .”).
125

Id.
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determination because she can best evaluate the policy consequences of finding a
given activity to be abnormally dangerous. Recall again that under Schwarzer’s
dichotomy, a judge resolves ultimate facts implicating “matters of law and policy” in
order to maintain predictability and consistency.126
A judge should determine the officer’s response capacity because the issue
implicates matters of law and policy. No rational basis justifies allowing a jury to
make this crucial determination in qualified immunity suits in the Sixth Circuit.
Requiring a judge to decide whether an activity is abnormally dangerous as a matter
of law protects important economic and public interests from sympathetic,
overzealous juries.127 Similarly, a judge evaluating qualified immunity under facts
that implicate the medical emergency-law enforcement standard should decide as a
matter of law what capacity the officer responded in in order to protect the public’s
interest in effective law enforcement.
Judges can decide the issue based on an impartial balancing of the facts with
qualified immunity’s policies. Judges will better recognize the need to promote
qualified immunity’s policies.128 Specifically, they will recognize that consistency in
outcomes will encourage officers to do all in their power when responding to a
medical emergency. The judge’s superior ability to marshal precedents and legal
concepts will promote fairness and consistency under the Peete test. Most
importantly, the judge’s determining the issue at the outset will decrease the social
costs of litigation.129 On one hand, if the officers did act in a medical emergency
capacity, summary judgment will more likely follow; on the other hand, if the
officers are found to have acted in a law enforcement capacity, then precious
resources and time need not be wasted at the trial on what should be a threshold
issue.
In McKenna, the majority’s reasons for its refusing to make the officer’s
response capacity a matter of law fail to persuade. First, the court asserted that
judges do not have “any unique experience or expertise” that would make them
superior to the jury in evaluating an officer’s response capacity.130 Granted, judges,
like juries, lack expertise in proper medical protocol. But, they do have superior
legal abilities. Those legal abilities will empower the judge to make rulings based
on sophisticated policy considerations that a jury cannot consider. Here again, the
abnormally dangerous activity analogy further weakens the majority’s selfdeprecating analysis. Judges are tasked with weighing social and scientific policy
considerations131 against the damage that the activity is causing and asked to rule on
the issue as a matter of law. Judges typically do not have any special scientific or
126

Chen, supra note 38, at 89.

127

On this point, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. l (1977).

128

See supra Part II.B.

129

Again, this point is most crucial because the social cost reduction rationale is now the
dominant contemporary justification for qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
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McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 442 (6th Cir. 2010).
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For instance, judges will consider evidence of the damage the activity causes the
community, the usefulness of the activity to the community, the extent to which the activity is
customarily carried out in the community, and other factors.
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economic skills that make them better suited than the jury to weigh these factors.
Yet, policy considerations demand a judge’s impartiality and analytical
sophistication in order to promote consistent, sensible outcomes so that tort law does
not overburden socially valuable activities.
Here too, important policy considerations demand a judge’s trained reasoning to
promote socially valuable law enforcement activity. Indeed, judges are actually
logically intended to deal with this issue even more so than the abnormally
dangerous activity issue. Suits against public officials generally arise from alleged
deprivations of constitutional rights. Presumably, judges are far more competent
than the jury to apply constitutional principles and policies to a set of given facts.
The judge’s expertise in applying the relevant constitutional principles (e.g., the
standards for unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment) to
alleged constitutional violations ensures the judge will make a far more nuanced,
objective evaluation of the officer’s conduct against the backdrop of proper
constitutional standards. In sum, contrary to McKenna’s assertion, judges have
substantially superior ability to resolve the medical emergency-law enforcement
issue as a matter of law before the case goes to trial.
The Sixth Circuit improperly places the response capacity issue too far along the
“factual” side of Schwarzer’s continuum.132 It gives far too much power and
deference to the jury on a question that a judge should answer as a matter of law. If
the Sixth Circuit continues to apply the Peete medical emergency-law enforcement
standard, it should apply a de novo standard of review to the officer’s response
capacity to resolve the qualified immunity inquiry. This standard could help ensure
that arbitrary results, like McKenna, get overruled as a matter of law. Judge Rogers
took this position in his McKenna dissent.133 De novo review alone, however, is not
enough. In order to eliminate the problems discussed above, the Sixth Circuit should
also guide the confused lower courts and unequivocally hold that the medical
emergency-law enforcement issue is a question of law for the court, rather than the
jury. In sum, in order to preserve any fairness or logic left under the Sixth Circuit’s
questionable test, the court must entrust judges to resolve the issue based on
qualified immunity’s underlying policy and fairness considerations.
IV. IS QUALIFIED IMMUNITY THE PROBLEM? A RESPONSE TO THE DOCTRINE’S
CRITICS134
Scholars have roundly criticized the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity
framework under Harlow and its progeny.135 Professor Alan Chen, a renowned critic
132

See Schwarzer, supra note 108.
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McKenna, 617 F.3d at 447 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Here, the relevant standard
concerns whether the officers acted as law enforcement officers or as emergency medical
responders, and this court must therefore review the answer to this question de novo.”).
134

This section of the Note primarily focuses on the hypothetical arguments Professor Alan
K. Chen might make in favor of the Sixth Circuit’s qualified immunity jurisprudence. The
arguments are purely hypothetical and should not be construed to represent Chen’s actual
views. The arguments are hypothetical because as of this writing, Professor Chen had not
responded to a request for comment on the Sixth Circuit developments.
135
See, e.g., Chen supra note 38; Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55
EMORY L. J. 229 (2006); Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51
VAND. L. REV. 583 (1983).
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of qualified immunity law, argues that the current approach is problematic because
the defense’s main goal of resolving claims early cannot be reconciled with the
inherently fact-intensive inquiry the defense’s framework demands.136 Indeed, Chen
argues that qualified immunity is fundamentally incompatible with summary
judgment, “[t]he principal, but surprisingly unrecognized, doctrinal consequence of
the Court’s current approach is that the factual aspect has made qualified immunity
conceptually irreconcilable with traditional summary judgment doctrine.”137 The
ideas and critiques at the heart of Chen’s scholarship may have inspired the Sixth
Circuit to run roughshod over the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity framework.
This section of the Note highlights Chen’s ideas, identifies how they may have
inspired the Sixth Circuit’s medical emergency-law enforcement standard, and
shows why his discounting the positive effects the current doctrine has on public
officials is flawed.
Chen would assert that the Sixth Circuit’s medical emergency-law enforcement
standard results from qualified immunity’s irreconcilable paradox between facts and
summary judgment.138 He notes the upshot of this paradox, “what may be occurring
. . . is that federal courts now view entitlement to qualified immunity not as a pure
matter of law, but as a question of ‘ultimate fact.’”139 Chen would argue that
because the “substantial factual component” in qualified immunity analysis has
prohibited the lower courts from establishing a coherent analytical approach, the
Sixth Circuit’s adding the medical emergency-law enforcement capacity wrinkle to
its qualified immunity inquiry is unsurprising.140 Chen ultimately concludes that
since qualified immunity and summary judgment are fundamentally incompatible,
qualified immunity should be treated as a defense “on the merits” that should be
asserted at trial, rather than in pre-trial motions.141 Furthermore, Chen argues that
qualified immunity’s fact-intensive nature and open-ended reasonableness standard
not only fail to reduce social costs associated with litigation, but they also generate
the “secondary social costs” of litigating the defense itself at the summary judgment
stage.142
Given those arguments, Chen would likely endorse the Sixth Circuit’s attempt to
distill qualified immunity into a more nuanced, fact-based inquiry. Since the Sixth
136

Chen, supra note 38, at 6-8.
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Id. at 69. See also id. at 72 (“[S]o long as it remains ‘qualified,’ or fact-dependent,
[qualified] immunity can never be entirely successful . . . in acting as a barrier to trial or
pretrial discovery.”).
138

Id. at 72.
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Id. at 88. For a detailed discussion of Judge Schwarzer’s “ultimate fact” regime, see
supra Part III.B.2; see also Schwarzer, supra note 108.
140

See Chen, supra note 38, at 79.

141

Id. at 31. In particular, Chen advocates the defense on the merits approach in his socalled “I didn’t do it” situations, where the entitlement to qualified immunity turns on which
version of the facts the jury accepts. In other words, when the question of whether entitlement
to qualified immunity is clearly proper or improper turns on which version of disputed facts
the jury wishes to accept, the judge would have little or no role in making a legal judgment at
the summary judgment stage.
142

Id. at 98-99.
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Circuit expressly endorsed sending the medical emergency-law enforcement issue to
the jury,143 Chen would argue that the doctrine and others like it will shift the
qualified immunity issue to what he views as the proper place, the trial.144 Chen’s
scholarship indicates that he would reject the policy arguments advanced in this Note
that would encourage judges to rule on the medical response-law enforcement
standard as a matter of law. Indeed, he generally asserts that constitutional rights
rarely become strict questions of law, “[t]he only context in which the issue of the
clearly established nature of the legal rights at stake can be considered to be a pure
question of law is when the Court truly breaks new ground and develops, in
common-law fashion, an entirely new constitutional doctrine.”145 He would likely
agree with the McKenna majority that if judges decided the issue, they would merely
“substi[tute] [their] judgment about the overall character of a set of facts for that of
the jury.”146 The Sixth Circuit, then, seems to have either been influenced by Chen’s
ideas or to have shared his general concerns about the role of facts and the jury in
resolving qualified immunity.147
Chen’s and the Sixth Circuit’s arguments to support an increased role of the
factfinder in qualified immunity analysis do not lack merit, but Chen himself
concedes that the assertions lack empirical support.148 He also couches that
concession by noting that arguments favoring the present doctrine also lack
empirical support.149 Here, Chen goes too far. Although critics and advocates alike
lament the lack of empirical data on qualified immunity,150 empirical data exists that
at a minimum demonstrates the need for preemptive deterrence that qualified
immunity in its present (or a very similar) form provides. For example, the increase
in unsuccessful lawsuits against police officers demonstrates the growing public
distrust towards police officers. In 1981, California residents placed 8,686
complaints against police, and only 18% (1,552) of those complaints were
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McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 443 (6th Cir. 2010).
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See Chen, supra note 38, at 31.
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Id. at 42.
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McKenna, 617 F.3d at 443.
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See, e.g., id. at 442 (“The law enforcement/medical-emergency responder distinction
matters only in the narrow class of cases in which Peete might bar suit. And while this
question involves more than determining what acts took place, juries are often asked to go
beyond the finding of historical facts and to make objective characterizations in their role as
factfinders.”).
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Chen, supra note 38, at 102 (“Unfortunately, this is all speculation . . . there is no
empirical foundation for the advocates of the present qualified immunity doctrine or its
critics.”).
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Id.

150

See id.; see also Rosen, supra note 35, at 151 n.79.
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sustained.151 In 2000, the trend worsened, as residents filed 23,395 complaints
against police officers, and only 10% (2,395) of those complaints were sustained.152
These statistics alone do not tell us much about qualified immunity’s
effectiveness, but they do allow one to infer that restricting qualified immunity with
artificial tests, like the Peete test, will only serve to deter litigation-weary officers
further. To be sure, qualified immunity in its present form is an imperfect doctrine.
In this regard, it differs little from any other legal doctrine that produces varied
results. Chen might argue that the Peete test is laudable because it discourages the
“secondary social costs” of “try[ing] the case twice” by forcing counsel to litigate the
defense at the summary judgment stage.153 This argument, however, fails to credit
qualified immunity’s careful balance between entitling legitimate plaintiffs to redress
and preserving the effectiveness of law enforcement.154
To strike this balance, qualified immunity entitles the defendant to summary
judgment only if the judge, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, concludes no constitutional violation occurred.155 In essence, a summary
judgment hearing on qualified immunity ends in one of three ways: (1) The
plaintiff’s facts show that the officer’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right,
and the case ends under Saucier’s first prong; (2) The plaintiff’s facts show that a
constitutional violation occurred, no “clearly established law” governed the officer’s
conduct, and the case ends under Saucier’s second prong; or (3) The disputed facts
would either establish or refute that the officer committed a constitutional violation
of a clearly established law, and the court will deny summary judgment.156 The
upshot of this trio is that a “savvy plaintiff” has “every incentive to claim
. . . exaggeratedly egregious behavior in order to clear summary judgment.”157 In
other words, legitimate constitutional tort plaintiffs should have no trouble defeating
summary judgment at minimal cost under the current standard. Similarly, even
plaintiffs with arguably frivolous claims can defeat summary judgment by pleading
exaggerated facts or omitting facts showing the officers acted reasonably from the
pleadings. In either scenario, Chen’s concern that litigating the defense creates
substantial secondary costs seems illusory, or at least exaggerated. Chen’s lack of
empirical evidence supports this conclusion. In sum, Chen unfairly discounts
qualified immunity’s deterrent effects, and his hypothetical support of the Peete test
would not carry empirical weight.

151
Rosen, supra note 35, at 149 (citing 2000 CAL. ST. ATT’Y GEN. OFF., CRIME & DELINQ.
ANN.
REP.,
Table
56,
available
at
http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/publications/candd/cd00/odb.pdf).
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V. CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity’s forgiving standard leaves little doubt that the Peete test is
unnecessary, because current qualified immunity doctrine achieves its balancing
purpose by permitting meritorious claims to go forward and prohibiting frivolous
claims from doing so. To be sure, qualified immunity has its shortcomings. Even
advocates of the current doctrine have suggested changes, like a restricted discovery
at the motion stage to help the judge resolve factual issues bearing on the legal prong
of the analysis.158 But, to establish a wholesale, ill-defined innovation of the doctrine
that applies whenever an officer responds to a medical emergency opens a proverbial
gaping wound where a small bandage would suffice. Furthermore, if such small
improvements are made to qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit and other lower
courts should wait for the Supreme Court to make them. If the lower federal courts
were to continue making Peete-type innovations, qualified immunity would be
thrown into a hapless state of inconsistency in the courts. Constitutional tort
plaintiffs and officers alike stand to suffer significantly if the law falls into such an
inconsistent state.
Qualified immunity as it currently stands effectively accomplishes its goals of
giving plaintiffs right to redress for legitimate constitutional violations, insulating
officers from crippling liability in unfair circumstances, and ensuring that society
and officers do not have to bear excessive social costs from frivolous litigation. The
complex relationship between facts and the relevant constitutional legal principles
demand courts take steps to resolve the issue as a matter of law wherever possible.
The current doctrine permits this outcome in many scenarios. The Peete test and
similar innovations, however, do not. They take too much power away from judges
skilled in resolving decidedly legal questions. Such a usurping threatens to
undermine the very policies qualified immunity intends to support.

158
Rosen, supra note 35, at 163-67. Rosen suggests permitting discovery of materials like
the regulations available to the officer at the time of the incident, limited interrogatories, and
discovery into the practices the police department employs to give relevant legal information
to its officers. These would establish whether a law was clearly established. He also suggests
that plaintiffs should be allowed to introduce limited affidavits and eyewitness testimony to
establish the nature of the officer’s conduct. See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
646 n. 6 (1987) (noting that where the facts are disputed, discovery specially tailored to the
qualified immunity question might be necessary before the motion can be adjudicated).
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